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THE CRITERION OP RESPONSIBILITY IN INSANITY.
"ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT HBA". This
maxim, so severely criticised by Stephen^ and ad¬
mitting necessarily of many exceptions, has neverthe¬
less, since popularised by Coke in his Third Insti¬
tute, generally come to be regarded as the funda¬
mental maxim of our Criminal Law.
The outward act alone does not constitute the
crime. There must also be a "compassing, intent or
imagination" of the same. Stated otherwise; there
can be no crime without a guilty intent. This guilty
intent may be general or specific. Where general, it
need not necessarily be a criminal intention, but
may consist in cases involving a mistake of fact,
merely an intention to do a wrongful act, short of a
crime. This was laid down by Denman J. in Rex v
Prince, who said that a man who does an act which he
knows to be illegal in the sense of amounting to a
civil wrong, but which he does not know to be crimin¬
al, cannot set up a legal defence by merely proving
that he thought he was committing a different kind
of wrong from that which in fact he was committing.
""Hist. Or. Law Of England V.2, ch. 18.
In certain other crimes, the "mens rea" is specific
and may then be strictly identified with the crimin¬
al intention. In cases where, owing to the defini¬
tion of the crime, such special intent must be
demonstrated, the "mens rea" must be specific.
In law the existence of the "mens rea" is pre¬
sumed. The criminal act itself is regarded as prima
facie proof of its existence. The absence of "mens
rea" renders the accused non imputable i.e., he is
entitled to an acquittal in respect of conduct which
but for such absence or intent, would render him
liable.
There is a presumption in law that every man
intends the consequences of his own acts; but this
presumption may be rebutted and the absence of "mens
rea" demonstrated, in certain cases of insanity and
of drunkenness.
Illustrative of this principle, drunkenness
rendering a person incapable of the intent, would be
and is an answer in a charge of attempted suicide.
In Rex v Moore, drunkenness was held to negative
such intent. In the words of Chief Justice Jervis;
"If the prisoner was so drunk as not to know what
""'Kenny Outlines Cr. Law. p.51.
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she was about, how oan you say she intended to
destroy herself?"
This case, quoted witn approval by our present
lord Chancellor in Kex v Beard, conveniently leads
to the consideration of the difference in regard to
legal liability of one who performs a criminal act
in a state of drunkenness and one performing a
similar act during an attack of delirium tremens.
This introductorily, and before proceeding to a
detailed examination of the subject in issue .,
"Evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved
incapacity in the accused to form the intent
necessary to constitute the crime and merely
establishing that his mind was affected by drink so
that he more readily gave way to some violent
passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man
intends the natural consequences of his act.
The defence which is founded on drunkenness is
one thing. The defence which is founded on insanity
is another. The relevant considerations are not
identical." *
In delirium tremens, insanity whether produced
by drunkenness or otherwise is a defence to the
*Dir. Pub. Pros, v Beard. House of Lords, 1920.
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crime charged. The law takes no note of the cause
of the insanity and it is immaterial whether
the insanity is permanent or temporary. The
direction given by Mr. Justice Stephen is still laijfc
"If a man by drunkenness brings on a state of
disease which causes such a degree of madness even
for a time, which would have re lieve d him from
responsibility if it had been caused in any other
way, then he would not be criminally responsible..
If you think there was a distinct disease caused
by drinking but differing from drunkenness and
that by reason thereof he did not know that the
act was wrong, you will find a verdict of "not
guilty on the ground of insanity".** This decision
was approved by the House of lords in their recent
pronouncement in the case of Rex v Beard, where
the law regarding drunkenness as a defence in
murder cases was authoritatively and finally stated.
There has been no such recent authoritativB'pro¬
nouncement in regard to the defence of insanity
in a trial for murder or similar crime. In such
oases, our law is still based on the Answers given
by a majority of judges in the House of lords
*R. v Davis, 1881. 14 Cov. C.C. P.563.
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after the McHaghten trial in 1843. In point of law
such answer should possess no inherent authority.
Ihey have what is termed "derivative authority".
The answers were not given as judgments "but arose as
t
a result of a debate in the House of lords on the
McNaghten trial. At this debate it was agreed that
the opinion of the judges should be sought in regard
to the law applied to cases where the defence of
insanity is tendered. Since that date, these
answers possessed of no binding authority, have
nevertheless become the basis for directions by the
judges on the matter of the accused's "responsibility,
Shis term, which will arise frequently in the
course of our examination of the subject, calls for
special scrutiny lest we ascribe to it any significa¬
tion other than that which it is generally conceded
to possess. It does not mean "moral responsibility,
and so a consideration of the metaphysical questions
underlying the doctrines of Free Will and of
Determinism will not arise. Its meaning is purely
"legal responsibility" or liability to be punished
for one's acts under the present state of the law.
She term is a legal one and nothing more. Sir
James Stephen says: "Our leading principle which
should never be lost sight of as it runs through the
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whole subject, is that judges directing juries have
to del exclusively with this question: Is this
person responsible in the sense of being liable by
the Law of England as it is, to be punished for the
act which he has done?"*
The penal law lays down what acts are to be
punished and what acts are to be exempt from punish¬
ment, i.e., it determines the responsibility. Kvery
man accused of a like crime has a like responsibility
By the Criterion of Responsibility we mean the
test applied to determine whether the accused is
liable to punishment according to the present state
of our criminal law. By the criterion of responsi¬
bility in insanity we mean such test applied to the
acoused where the defence is one of insanity. Such
criterion is afforded at present by the Answers
above referred to in McKaghten's case.
This case, which aroused so much public feeling
at the time, and which resulted later in the debate
in the House, and the more famous Answers of the
judges, arosa out of the murder of Mr. Drummond,
private secretary to Sir Robert Peel, by one
McRaghten, McNaghten, mistaking Mr. Drummond for
Sir Robert Peel whom he imagined to be responsible
X
x
*Hist. Or. Law, 7. Ch.19
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for, or implicated in, an alleged conspiracy against
himself, shot him and thereafter was tried and
acquitted on the verdict of "not guilty on the
grounds of insanity".
It may be of interest, if we explain parentheti
cally, how this latter verdict has been altered in
fona and now reads "Guilty but insane". Sir Herbert
Stephen has recently made public the reason by which
this charige came about* In 1882 a lunatic fired a
pistol at Queen Victoria, He was tried for high
treason and found "not guilty". This verdict dis¬
pleased Her Majesty who, not appreciating the fact
that to constitute the crime there must be in addi¬
tion to the outward act, the criminal "mens rea",
insisted that the man was really guilty and that the
verdict should be "Guilty but insane". This verdict
was made statutory by the Trial of lunatics Act 1883
To consider the Answers themselves. The Answers
to Questions 1 and 4 are of little practical value,
as compared with the Answer to Questions 2 and 3.
They afford, however, an additional criterion in the
defence of insanity to that state in the joint answe^
inasmuch as they lay down that proof that the accused
was labouring under a partial delusion (but was
♦'Legal Responsibilities" corr. Times,15/l2/2o
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(hsd'J ?
otherwise insane ) and that by reason of this delusion^
he acted in such a way, that, did the state of things
exist as he deludedly imagined, it would have justi¬
fied or condoned his action, he would to that extent
\>e non-imputable .
It is not incumbent on us to enter into a detail ¬
ed criticism of these two answers — although endless
criticism might be made — because they are of very
small importance in practice. So although it is true
that these answers do not in reality reply to the
questions they affect to answer, and that they are
m
based on a misconception of the nature of a delusion,
they may be regarded, as far as our present day trials
are concerned, as effete: but they are still Law.
JJo doubt the judges were considerably influenced
by the evidence of Dr. Munro, whose views could not
now be accepted by psychiatrists. It is to his
evidence that must be ascribed the phrase occurring
in the answers -"persons w&o labour under partial
delusions only, and are not in other respects insane."
The term "partial delusion" has provoked much
criticism from the many writers on this subject and,
applied to persons who are not otherwise insane, is
said to be without meaning. Even in the Borderland
case of the mattoid type where delusion on an abstract
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subject may "be the only objective evidence of
eccentricity, it is undoubted that the whole
personality is affected.
'By a partial delusion', says Br. Mercier,# 'I
should myself understand a delusion which was not
completely confirmed but about the truth of which
the deluded person entertained a doubt.' At the
time, too, when the Judges gave their answers, the
terms 'delusion1 and 'insanity' were regarded as
being almost synonymous, but with the growth of
knowledge of insanity and the latitude with which
certain passages of the Judges' answers have been
construed: serious defects in the Answers have been
glossed over; as also increased attention has been
focussed on the criterion laid down in the Joint
answer to questions 2 and 3, Questions 2 and 3, and
their answer,which is supremely important, are
as follows
Question 2, What are the proper questions to be
submitted to the Jury when a person afflicted with
insane delusions respecting one or more particular
subjects or persons, is charged with the commission
of a crime {murder for instance) and insanity is set.
up as a defence?
Question 3. In what terms ought the question to I e
*Cr. Res. p, 176. g,
left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind,
when the act was committed?
Answer 2 and a. "As these two questions appear
to us to be more conveniently answered together we
submit our opinion to be that the jurors ought to
be told in all cases that every man is presumed to
be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason
to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary
be«proved to their satisfaction and that to establish
a defence on the ground of insanity it must be
clearly proved that at the time of committing the
act the accused was labouring under such a defect
of reason from disease of the mind as not to know
the nature and quality of the act or if he did know
it, not to know that he was doing what was wrong...
fhis criterion - knowledge of the nature and
quality of the act or knowledge of its wrongness -
was intended to apply only to cases of delusion.
It is not now so restricted, and is quoted by
judges at the present day to enable the jury to
determine the responsibility in all cases of insanity.
It is referred to as the "knowledge test" in
distinction to the tests applied in other countries
e.g. Germany, where the criterion is whether there
is free determination of the will.
10.
To consider the words and phrases seriatim:
Uature and 'quality* may he regarded as syn¬
onymous terms. Sir James Stephen does not so
regard them and construes 'quality' as the 'legal
significance' of the act. Oppenheimer has drawn a
more extensive differentiation? hut in practice,this
seems of little import.
The term 'to know' presents more difficulties;
for the whole significance of the answer depends on
our interpretation of this word. "Knowing" has
heen described as an intellectual faculty purely
separable as it were from the other faculties.
Psychologists do not now accept this.
Intellectual processes are not now regarded as
being purely cognitive, they are not entirely
separable from the influence of the emotions and
the will. "Every mental act", says McDougallf*
"presents three aspects, a knowing, a being affected
and a striving; technically, a cognition, and
affection and a conation and these are not separable
parts of the thinking process, but one or other of
these aspects is commonly dominant so we are led to
speak of each kind of mental process by the name of
the dominant aspect."
*Oppenheimer G.R. of Lunatics (1909) p.
**Psychology, P.63.
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Sir James Stephen in declaring that a man who
acts under an irresistible impulse does not know
that his act is wrong, ascribes to the word 'know'
a meaning anticipatory of the modern psychological
teaching, but nevertheless, one which is far removed
from the popular usage of the word. In ordinary
parlance the words 'to know' mean 'to be aware of
and this awareness applied to a criminal act to be
complete would seem to have to comprise the
following:
1. There must be awareness on the part of
the subject that he is the actor.
2. There must be awareness on the part of the
subject in relation to the object i.e. the act
performed. He must know that he is doing the act,
and what act he is doing.
laid alongside the criterion, knowledge of the
nature and quality of the act, or if not, then '
knowledge of its wrongness, our two propositions
«
will read;
If the actor is aware of his; identity as such,
he must also be aware not only that he does the act,
but realise the nature of the act he does i.e. to
cite the example quoted in the MoHaghten trial, if
he cut a man's throat thinking it to be the throat
of a pig, he cannot "be said to know the nature of
A.
his act. If he does not 'know' this he must know
that the act is wrong morally or legally.
If 'nature' and 'quality' are regarded as
synonymous then 'wrong' perhaps were better
construed as 'legally wrong'; but where 'quality'
would indicate (as Stephen considers it does) the
'legal significance' of the act, thaa^srong' will be
more properly regarded as 'morally wrong', otherwise
the answer is needlessly redundant. However, that
may be, one ingredient in the knowledge would seem
to be required i.e. that the act is a criminal one
by the law of the land.
She word 'wrong' is interpreted by Stephen to
mean 'morally wrong'. Mercier and most writers
since Stephen's time are of the same opinion.
Oppenheimer strenuously contends that the word is
to be regarded as meaning 'legally wrong' and in
support of this contention quotes Lord Brougham in
the debate in the House of Lords in McHaghten's case
who stated that he knew the learned judges used the
phrase with reference to the commands of the law.
fhey could only know one kind of right and wrong;
"the right is when you act according to the law,
and the wrong is when you break it".
13.
Our own opinion is that 'wrong' must he construed
as 'iegally wrong'. In support of this may he
quoted the direction by Denman J. in Rex v Offord
(1840), prior to McDaghten's case:
"The question is whether the prisoner ....
was under the influence of a diseased mind and was
really unconscious, at the time he was committing the
act, that it was a crime", and that hy Baron
Brarawell, soma years after (in R v Dove 1856)
"Doing what is wrong means an act prohibited hy law
because a man might imagine that killing was a righ;
thing to do, and it might he contrary to law. For
instance, he might think it right to take from the
rich and give to the poor; hut if he did it, not
knowing it was wrong, he must not know that the
thing which he did was what the law will punish
him for."
Whatever exception may he taken to the wording
of this criterion it cannot he justly stated that
the terms above mentione d ever do cause a technical obstruct
tihh to thecourse of justice. Rather, the criticism
which is directed against the 'knowledge test' is
that the only faculty of mind whose disorder is
evidence of an absence of responsibility is the
faculty of 'knowing'.
14.
The faculty of knowing is the test of
irresponsibility and in nowise a test of insanity.
The law does not presume to say what constitutes or
does not constitute insanity. It merely lays down
what constitutes the state of responsibility. The
law does not admit, as does the French law, that a
state of insanity necessarily entails a state of ir¬
responsibility.
The law states that the accused will be deemed
irresponsible if: (1) he was insane at the time
of the act and (2) that on account of disease of
his mind he did not know what he was doing or did
not know he was doing wrong.
In regard to the first of these, the presence
of insanity is ascertained by medical experts by
such criteria as they see fit to employ. The mode
of establishing its presence is no concern of the
laws.
In regard to the second - the criterion of
responsibility. This is not intended to be the
law's criterion of insanity. It is simply the test
which the law applies to find out whether, where
insanity is demonstrated, the accused is to be held
liable for his acts. It is to the failure in
disoriminati&g between the criterion of insanity
15.
ancl the criterion of responsibility - the one a
medical, the other a legal matter - that much of
the present confusion in which the subject finds
itself is to be traced. Again and again writers
in attacking the present criterion of responsibility
do so under the misapprehension that the law
formulated therein i a criterion of insanity. This
misunderstanding can be easily apprehended when we
consider these cases in which there is insanity and
where there exists or seems in the medical expertfe
view, to exist, a mental state not in accordance
with accountability. In such a case where the
accused is adjudged responsible , and that by means
of a criterion of his "knowledge" of the act,which,
as it happens, would in no wise demonstrate the
accused's insanity, the expert may be excused for
imagining that the law has seemed to deny the fact
of insanity, in denying the irresponsibility.
This erroneous conception of the nature of the
criterion of responsibility is intensified by the
fact that the expert witness is interrogated not only
as to the fact of alienation, but also as to whethar
the accused "knew" the nature of the act or its
wrongness - an interrogation psychological in
essence, which many medical men feel it impossible
16.
to answer.
How, the law ought to be an enlightened law,
and in determining responsibility, nught to employ
a criterion in accordance with the views of
enlightened established opinion on mental disease
and its effects. Such defects,as the criterion in
McHaghten's case undoubtedly has, have been
considerably diminished by the very elastic
interpretation put upon the phraseology especially
in recent years; and it is to this elasticity of
interpretation that must be ascribed the fact that
very rarely does injustice ensue on its application.
How liberal this construction may become we have
seen in noting the inclusion (by Sir James Stephen
and others) in the category of defective 'knowledge',
an "irresistible impulse" to do a criminal act.
(Vide ante.) The law does not however recognise
this as a defence, and does not regard such an
impulse as annulling the presumption of knowledge,
and indeed such impulses are rare in cases of
undoubted alienation in which the accused has at the
same time, knowledge of the nature of the act,
arising,as they do, rather, in cases classified as
psychoneuroses, and therefoe not eligible as a
defence.
Those who allege the law's injustice on this
matter in that the law regards only one type of
insanity (and perhaps only that type In which there
are partial delusions only), who lay stress on the
equivocal interpretations put on the words 'know' and
'wrong' , who say that the Answers constitute no bind¬
ing authority, or that at "best they only deal with
certain specified questions and are not intended to
he a complete exposition of the law, are answered
effectually by the accepted practise of our courts.
Ho', to our mind more cogent arguments directed
against the state of our law regarding the criminal
reponsibility of the insane, emanate rather from
those who would prefer to regard insanity "per se"
as conferring immunity from punishment. These argu¬
ments may be specified as follows
A delusion is not to be regarded as a mental
disorder affecting only one particular ©pheree of
mental activity, leaving the rest of the mind unim¬
paired. Rather the whole personality is poisoned at
its source: the whole reason is oorrupted.
"In all cases in which delusion exists," says
Mercier, "there is invariably associated with the
delusion and disorder and confusion of the process of
thinking which prevents the deluded person from
18.
forming sane judgments about matters that are connect-
«
ed in his mind with the delusion. This area of dis¬
order is of different extent in different cases. It
#
is always difficult to know how far it extends," and
elsewhere "the delusion is not an isolated disorder.
It is merely the superficial indication of a deep-
seated and widespread disorder. Precisely how far it
extends it is never possible to say; but it is certain
that the delusion itself is the least part of the
disorder and for this reason no deluded person ought
ever to be regarded as fully responsible for any act tje
may do,"
How the above statements of this brilliant writer
are to be reconciled with his entire concurrence with
the dictum of Stephen that "it is, and it is quite
clear that it ought to be the law, that the mere
existence of an insane delusion which does not in fact
influence particular parts of the conduct of the per¬
son affected by it, has no effect upon their legal
character * is difficult to understand. ****
*
C. R. p. 189.
**
do. p. 126.
Hist. Cr. law, 7.2, Ch. 19,
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If it "be true that the extent to which a
delusion affects the mind is indefinable, that its
mere presence indicates a corruption of the whole
personality, that it is never possible to say that
certain parts of the conduct are unaffected by it,
how can it be stated that such and such an act is un¬
tainted by itB presence? Contrariwise, if the view
be accepted that conduct in a deluded person may be
uninfluenced by the delusion, and that the person may
be regarded - so far as that particular conduct is
concerned - as sane, is this not tantamount to an
admission in the practical truth of that doctrine of
"partial delusion, the person being otherwise sane" -
a doctrine unsupported by any authority? (The accept¬
ance of this latter view that conduct which does not
appear to be influenced by a co-existing delusion, is
not thereby influenced, has its corollary in the law
regarding the testamentary capacity of the insane;
Civil Irresponsibility is not assumed by law necess¬
arily to result from insanity. By law an insane
person may make a will or a contract, and if the
party making such was not influenced by his insanity
to make such will or contract otherwise than he would
have made it if sane, it will be a binding' one. G.M.
Bobertson opposing the doctrine of "insanity therefore
20
irresponsibility" says: "Were the view accepted that
all insane persons were irresponsible for all their
acts because of their insanity - which is quite at
variance with medical experience and knowledge - it
would deprive all insane persons without further
evidence ©r inquiry, of their other responsibilities
and rights. It would constitute a great hardship if,
for example the power of an Insane person to make a
will who at present was held by law to have this
testamentary capacity, were taken away from him
without inquiry."*
Such deprivation might not, of course, take
place, even although the doctrine of criminal irre¬
sponsibility in insanity were accepted; for the
reform of one department of our law is frequently
unattended by its logical outcome in another: and
it would only be in keeping with many other anomalies
of our law to have a recognition of criminal irre¬
sponsibility and at the same time in certain cases of
insanity, civil responsibility.
^one the less, we cannot accept this doctrine^
for whilst it is true that the presence of a delusion
does stigmatise its possessor as insane; and whilst
*
Times 15/12/20.
**Irresponsibility in all cases of insanity.
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it is therefore incorrect to speak of such a person
as ever being "not otherwise insane", nevertheless
such insane person can and undoubtedly often does
perform acts (e.g. criminal acts) which are not
really insane 'acts but which arise from the same
sources as those of sane persons.
In regard to the other pleas put forward for a
recognition of a state of irresponsibility in all
cases of insanity, we have flimsier arguments to
deal with. To advocate the universal irresponsib¬
ility of the insane, and at the same time never to
allow such a doctrine to have its logical outcome
in the institutions for the insane (where the
equivalent at any rate of punishment is every day
meted out to the offenders) is an irreconcilability.
Nor can it be doubted surely, that the majority of
lunatics are influenced by the ordinary hopes and
fears such as affect the conduct of all of us; and
that it is possible for them to act outside the
space of their insane conduct.
Even in cases gravely affected, many "can mask
their abnormal thoughts and act in an apparently
normal manner in spite of fixity of delusions.
This is commonly affected by paranoics to escape •
22,
hospital detention.*
We cannot accept this doctrine of irresponsib¬
ility. Such an upheaval of our judicial methods
as it would entail, with no compensatory benefit,
cannot be advocated.- Rather, we are of opinion
that the coalescence of the hitherto distinct
provinces of Medicine and law could not but be
attended by many dangers. The ever widening
conception of the term insanity coloured, as it
would be, by the ephemeral theories of the day
would be effectual in excusing a heterogeneous class
of persons, leaving only the innocent convicted of
crime for "only the innocent could be pronounced
free from psychical peculiarity".**
The criminal responsibility of the insane is
determined after the insanity has been admitted;
but to a considerable number of accused persons,
the law's criterion of responsibility cannot be
applied, inasmuch as such persons cannot be defined
as lunatics, although admittedly evidencing
consideraole departure from normal mentality, and
the criterion cannot apply where the lunacy is not
*Basis of Psychiatry (Buckley) p.173 (1921)
**Wharton & Stille's Med. June 1873.
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demonstrated. Comprising as they do, the mattoids
and eccentrics, the psychoneurotics, the victims of
hysteria in its manifold forms, they constitute the
"borderland cases" of insanity.
It has been urged in this country and in Franco
(by the representatives of the neoclassic school)
that such individuals should never incur a full
responsibility for their actions. In France the
borderland cases are not restricted to those we
have mentioned above, but under the appellation of
"demi-fous", include the senile, the degenerate and
those who on account of accident or illness, are
imagined to be more prone to commit criminal acts.
Such "diminished responsibility" would involve as itsi
consequences the mitigation of punishment.
Accurately defined, responsibility in its legal
sense admits of no degrees. It is absolute; and
the demand that such "demi-fous" should incur a
"diminished responsibility" has, strictly speaking,
no meaning. Mitigation of the punishment could
follow the determination of the responsibility, and
in practice very often in such cases does so. We
cannot subscribe to the demands of those who seek
to establish a state of "semi responsibility";
*Salleilles "Individualisation of punishment" p.303
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for we cannot hide from ourselves where such an
innovation would lead. It would lead to the
obliteration of the distinction, at present clear
cut and well defined, between a state of responsib¬
ility and irresponsibility - a distinction the
existence df which in its entirety is vital. The
present discretion allowed to the judges in all
such cases, and freely exercised, would appear to
form a sufficient saxe guard against the possibility
of injustice. It is not by the acceptance of the
view that irresponsibility invariably accompanies
insanity, nor by such suggestion as of the intro¬
duction of the criterion of "semi responsibility"
that our present law will be improved. Nor are we
disposed to seek any other criterion than that of
the judges in McNaghten's case. This criterion
exempts from punishment the great majority of the
criminal insane. It exempts the epileptic who acts
in a state of automatism. It does not exempt the
"moral imbecile" as a rule. It is not a perfect
criterion, but it has the merit of working well in
practise. There is a small percentage of cases
amongst the insane deserving of exemption, whom,
however, the criterion would find responsible.
We consider that the reform most likely to lead to
25.
their exoneration is that suggested by Gppenheimer.
In law a man is presumed to be sane and responsible
for his acts. Bven when proved to be insane he is
presumed to be responsible. It is this latter
presumption which Oppenheimer would wish to see
reversed. He says:
"I hold that whilst the most definite proof
should be required of the existence of mental
disease, when once it has been established that the
prisoner is a lunatie, the present presumption of
the law should be reversed; and it ought to be
laid down as a rule of evidence that those proved
to be of unsound mind should be assumed, until the
contrary be shown, not to know the nature and
quality of their acts and that which they were
gr
doing was wrong".
With this view we express our cordial agree¬
ment. Adopted, it would bring about a much needed
reform.
Gppenheimer adds that the arguments in its
favour would be immeasurahly strengthened if the
experts formed a permanent professional body
instructed and called by the court.
*Opp. C.R. P.253.
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The acutest controversy has ragecl around the
answers in McUaghten's case for well night, a century.
There is little hope of its dying down, stirred up
anew as it is, by every fresh case involving a
defence of insanity.; In one camp are those who
strive for the recognition of irresponsibility
in all cases of insanityj^these are united in
denying the justice of our present law. In the
other are those who are content to accept, with one
or more of the suggested modifications, the
criterion as laid down in McHaghten's case as being
as just and in application as equitable, as could be
devised. We number ourselves amongst the latter.
Meanwhile we should welcome a pronouncement of
our law by the highest judicial authorities, such as
would unify the many directions given since
Mclslaghten1 s day, discard those answers based on the
descredited theories of nature of delusion; and in
defining anew, the much disputed phraseology
embodied in them would clarify the conception of the
«
criticism of responsibility and its application.
The future may perhaps bring us, as a result of
the accumulated psychological studies of centuries,
a test more exact, more easily applicable and more
just than that embodied in the in
27.
MeHaghten's case - but this will continue to
afford, until that day arrives, our safest and
most practicable criterion.
28
S U M M A B Y.
A Study of the criminal "mens rea".
The relevant considerations in a defence of
drunkenness and in one of insanity, not identical.
Definition of 'responsibility'.
Answers of the judges reviewed and analysed.
The doctrine of 'partial delusion', in theory and
practice.
The criterion examined.
The significance of its phraseology.
Insanity should not always entail a state of
irre sponsibility.
Civil responsibilities of the Insane.
A state of semi-responsibility cannot be admitted.
Acceptance of the criterion as the most practicable
and the most just criterion available.
Plea, for the adoption of a change in procedure
(reversal of presumption of responsibility
in the insane) as recommended by Oppenheimer.
Question 1'What is the law respecting alleged
crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane
delusion in respect of one or more particular sub¬
jects or persons, as, for instance, where, at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, the
accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did
the act complained of with a view, under the influ¬
ence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging
some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing
some supposed public benefit?'
Question II. - 'What are the proper questions to be
submitted to the jury when a person afflicted with
insane delusions respecting one or more particular
subjects or persons, is charged with the commission
of a crime (murder for instance) and insanity is set
up as a defence.'
Question III. - 'In what terms ought the question
to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of
mind when the act was committed?'
Question 17, - 'If a person under an insane delusion
as to existing facts commits an offence in conse¬
quence thereof, is he thereby excused?'
Answer I. - Assuming that your Lordship^?
inquiries are confined to those persons who labour
under such partial delusions only, and are not in
other respects insane, we are of opinion that,
notwithstanding the, accused did the act complained
of with a view, under the influence of insane de¬
lusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed
grievance or injury, or of producing some public
benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according
to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew
at the time of committing such crime that he was
acting contrary to law, by which expression we
understand your Lordships to mean the law of the
land.'
ANSWER II and III. - 'As these two questions
appear to us to be more conveniently answered
together, we submit our opinion to be that the jur¬
ors ought to be told, in all cases, that every man
is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,
until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction;
and that, to establish a defence on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the
time of committing the act the accused was labouring
'/ A"4--? -
under §ubh a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or, if he did know it, (sic) that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The m<pde
of putting the latter part of the question to the
jury, on these occasions, has generally "been, whetheh
the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the
difference between right and wrong; which mode,
though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with
the jury, is not, we conceive, so accurate when put
generally and in the abstract, as when put with
reference to the party's knowledge of right and
wrong in respect to the very act with which he is
charged. If the question were to be put as to the
knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively
with reference to the law of the land, it might
tend to confound the jury by inducing them to be¬
lieve that an actual knowledge of the law of the
land was essential in order to lead to a convic¬
tion; whereas the law administered on the principle
that every one must be taken conclusively to know
it, without proof that he does know it. If the
accused was conscious that the act was one that he
ought not to do, and if that act was at the same
time contrary to the law of the land, he is
punishable; and the usual course, thereforev has
been to leave the question to the jury whether the
accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know
he was doing an act that was wrong; and this course],
we think, is correct, accompanied with such obser¬
vations and corrections as the circumstances of each
particular case may require.'
Answer IV.- 'The answer must of course depend on
the nature of the delusion; but, making the same
assumption as we did before, namely, that he labours
under such partial delusion only, and is not in ot he
respects insane, we think he must be considered in
the same situation as to responsibility as if the
facts with respect to which the delusions exist were
real, lor example, if under the influence of his
delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of
attempting~~to- take away his life, and kills that max},
as he supposes in self-defence, he would be exempt
from punishment. If his delusion was that the de¬
ceased had inflioted a serious injury to his
character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge
for such supposed injury, he would be liable to
punishment.1
